OpenAI: the firing that lasted 5 days

The facts

On November 17, 2023, OpenAI's board — composed of six members, four of whom were non-employees — announced the firing of CEO and co-founder Sam Altman. The official statement declared that Altman "was not consistently candid in his communications with the board, hindering its ability to exercise its responsibilities."

The decision caught almost everyone by surprise, including OpenAI executives and Microsoft, the primary investor with $13 billion invested. President Greg Brockman immediately resigned in solidarity with Altman. CTO Mira Murati was named interim CEO.

In the following 48 hours, the situation spiraled. Three senior researchers resigned. Investors — led by Thrive Capital and Tiger Global — pressured for Altman's reinstatement. The board appointed Emmett Shear (former Twitch CEO) as the new CEO, but the move didn't stop the hemorrhaging.

On Monday, November 20, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella announced that Altman and Brockman would lead a new AI research lab within Microsoft. The same day, over 700 of OpenAI's 770 employees signed an open letter threatening to resign and follow Altman to Microsoft if the board didn't step down.

On November 22 — five days after the firing — Altman was reinstated as CEO. Three of the four non-employee board members resigned. The new board was restructured with Bret Taylor (former Salesforce co-CEO) as chairman and Larry Summers (former US Treasury Secretary).

DAMM Analysis

Delimitation (2/10): The decision was delimited in the narrowest possible way: fire Altman for "lack of candor" without publicly specifying what he had done. The board didn't delimit the scope of consequences: they didn't assess the impact on employees, investors, customers, or OpenAI's competitive position. There was no succession plan, no prepared communication for stakeholders, no plan to manage the predictable Microsoft reaction.

Asymmetry (1/10): The asymmetry was catastrophic. The upside scenario (new CEO steers OpenAI toward the original AI safety mission) was highly improbable without employee and investor support. The downside scenario (mass exodus, loss of Microsoft, company destruction) was nearly certain given the relationship structure. The board bet the very existence of the $80 billion organization on a move with near-zero probability of success under the given conditions.

Room to Maneuver (1/10): Firing a CEO is one of the corporate moves with the least room to maneuver. Once publicly announced, reversing course is an institutional humiliation (which is exactly what happened). The board didn't secure employee support in advance, didn't negotiate with Microsoft, didn't prepare a credible and ready replacement CEO. Every exit route was closed before they even started.

Minimum Move (1/10): The minimum move would have been a private confrontation with Altman about specific concerns, with concrete requests and deadlines. If insufficient, the next step would have been to involve major investors and senior executives in a structured discussion. Firing without notice, without consulting Microsoft, without a succession plan, and without employee support is the exact opposite of a minimum move — it's the maximum move, executed in the worst possible way.